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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

JEFFREY GLORIOSO,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No- 900170-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
and (b) (1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for
Juab County, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly ruled that the arresting officer had a reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts to justify an investigative
stop of defendant's vehicle.

Because of the trial court's

advantageous position in determining the factual basis for a
motion to suppress, this Court will not reverse the trial court's
factual evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert.

granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989). However, in assessing the

trial court's legal conclusions based upon its factual findings,
this Court applies a correction of error standard.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1990):
Any peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address, and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jeffery Glorioso, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and (b) (1990) (R. 9). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence seized in a warrantless search of
his vehicle (R. 30). Upon the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion, defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant
to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), thereby
reserving his right to withdraw that plea should this Court rule
in his favor on appeal (R. 74-78).

Defendant filed a notice of

appeal on November 17, 1989 (R. 88).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 15, 1988 at approximately 1:00 p.m.,
Sergeant Paul Mangelson, a 22-year veteran of the Utah Highway
Patrol, was operating a hand-held radar unit to check the speeds
of vehicles traveling on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah (T. 15, 18, 19).
He observed two vehicles traveling northbound and clocked the
first vehicle at the speed of 70 miles per hour, five miles in
excess of the posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour (T. 19-20).
The second vehicle was maintaining the same speed and was
following at a very close and unsafe distance, within
approximately three car lengths of the first vehicle (Ld.).
Mangelson pursued the vehicles; they both exited 1-15 at the
South Nephi exit where they turned onto Highway 28 (T. 19).
Sergeant Mangelson intended to stop both vehicles, but he was
able to stop only the second vehicle (T. 20-21).

He did observe

that the first vehicle, the vehicle driven by defendant, was a
gray Chevrolet Celebrity with Florida license plates (hereinafter
referred to as defendant's vehicle) (T. 21). Mangelson also
testified that he could see two individuals in defendant's
vehicle (T. 54).
The vehicle that stopped was a 1985 silver, Plymouth
four door with Arizona license plates (hereinafter referred to as
the Arizona vehicle) (T. 21). Upon stopping the Arizona vehicle,
Mangelson advised the driver why he had been stopped and
requested his driver's license and vehicle registration (T. 2122).

One of the two passengers volunteered that he was the owner

of the vehicle and produced a temporary sticker that showed he
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was the owner of the car (T. 22-23).

Both passengers also

identified themselves, but neither had any form of identification
(T. 22).
As Sergeant Mangelson talked with the occupants of the
Arizona vehicle, he could smell the odor of marijuana coming from
the car (T. 23). Mangelson asked them if they had any drugs or
guns in the vehicle, and when they replied "no," he requested and
obtained consent to search the vehicle (T. 23-24; trial court's
Ruling of September 8, 1989, ("Ruling") at 2) (a copy of the
trial court's Ruling is attached hereto as Addendum A ) .

Before

searching the vehicle, Mangelson asked the three to exit the car
and patted them down for weapons (T. 24). In so doing he found
that one passenger had a $20 bill in his front pocket that was
rolled tightly and had a white powder on it, which indicated to
Mangelson that it had been used for the purpose of consuming
cocaine (T. 24-25).

All three also were carrying a large amount

of currency, between $160 to $550 each (T. 24, 67).
During a search of the vehicle's interior Mangelson
found under the passenger seat a bag of marijuana and a cocaine
sifter containing a small amount of white powder (T. 25). When
questioned about these materials, all three individuals denied
any knowledge about the sifter and marijuana (T. 26). Mangelson
then advised them of their rights, placed them under arrest and
called for backup assistance (Id.).

While awaiting assistance,

he continued to search the vehicle and found a loaded .357 Magnum
in a duffle bag in the back seat of the car (Id.).

He then

opened the trunk where he found two spare tires, one of which
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required four lug nuts while the other required five lug nuts (T.
27, 30). Mangelson concluded that one of the tires could not
possibly fit that vehicle (T. 35).
Mangelson also found a suitcase with a tag bearing the
name "Steven Gregory" attached to its handle (T. 26). That name
did not match the names of any of the three individuals in the
vehicle, and Mangelson asked if the owner of the suitcase was
present (T. 32). The three responded "no," and indicated that
they "had no idea" who Steven Gregory was (Id.).

He then asked

whether they were traveling with the other vehicle, and all three
immediately responded, "no," and said they didn't know anything
about the other car (T. 33). Mangelson opened the suitcase and
within it found another .357 Magnum, speed-loaders, a long
bladed, cold-steel knife and a garrote—a weapon described by
Mangelson as a chain with handles on each end that is used to
choke people (Id.. ) .
At that point Trooper Randy Ingerman arrived as backup
and Mangelson asked him to check the local business area for
defendant's vehicle, which Mangelson had last seen headed south
toward the nearby business area or to Levan (T. 34). Ingerman
was unable to find defendant's vehicle in the business area and
returned to the scene where Mangelson had stopped the Arizona
vehicle (T. 37).
Shortly thereafter, as the officers were preparing to
transport the three occupants of the Arizona vehicle to the
Public Safety Building in Nephi, defendant's vehicle passed by
and continued northbound on 1-15 (T. 37-39).

-5-

Mangelson told

Ingerman that that was the vehicle he was looking for and that he
was going to pursue and stop it, which he did (T. 39).
Upon stopping defendant's vehicle, Mangelson first
noted that the wheels on the car required five lug nuts and
concluded that one of the spare tires in the Arizona vehicle
would fit defendant's vehicle (T. 40). He then approached the
driver, defendant Jeffery Glorioso, and requested a driver's
license (T. 41). Defendant produced an Arizona driver's license
(^d.).

The passenger gave his name and also provided an Arizona

driver's license (Id.).

The name on the passenger's driver's

license matched the name on the unclaimed suitcase that Mangelson
had found in the Arizona vehicle (^d.).

Mangelson asked

defendant and passenger Steven Gregory if they were traveling
with the other vehicle and they said they were not (Id.).
Mangelson then asked Mr. Gregory why his suitcase was in the
trunk of the other car, and Gregory then acknowledged that they
were in fact traveling with the Arizona vehicle (T. 42).
During his conversations with defendant and Mr.
Gregory, Mangelson observed a "very strong odor" of raw marijuana
coming from the vehicle (T. 43). He asked if there were any
weapons in the car and sought permission to search the vehicle
(Id.).

Mangelson patted the two down for weapons and searched

the interior of the vehicle but did not find anything (T. 44).
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress,
Mangelson testified that he obtained consent to search the
vehicle but defendant testified that Mangelson did not ask for
permission to search the car (T. 43, 89). Judge Ballif ruled
that he would proceed on the basis that no consent was given and
required the prosecution to establish probable cause to justify
the search (T. 13, 43).
-6-

He then asked for a key to the trunk, and defendant said that
they had rented the car in Arizona and were never given a key to
2
the trunk

(Id*).

Mangelson then removed the bottom portion of

the back seat and confirmed that the trunk was full of marijuana
(T. 44-45).
Mangelson arrested defendant and Mr. Gregory (T. 45).
Trooper Ingerman, having transported two of the individuals from
the Arizona vehicle to the Juab County Jail, returned to help
transport defendant and Mr. Gregory to the Public Safety Building
(Id.).

Defendant's vehicle was also taken to the Public Safety

Building where a further search of the trunk revealed that it
contained 153 pounds of marijuana packaged in large garbage bags
(T. 45-48).
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the
seized evidence, Mangelson testified to the reasons he stopped
defendant's vehicle.

He stated that he wanted to stop

defendant's vehicle because he observed it speeding and when
the two cars passed by him they appeared to be traveling together
(T. 20). The two vehicles were traveling at the same rate of
speed and in very close proximity; they both took the same exit,
and they both turned south (T. 19-21).

During a search of the

vehicle that he initially thought was traveling with defendant's
vehicle, Mangelson found drug paraphernalia, cocaine,
marijuana, numerous weapons, two spare tires—one of which could
not possibly have fit the stopped vehicle, and luggage that did
Mangelson also testified at the hearing that he never was
able to find a key to the trunk (T. 44).
-7-

not belong to any of the vehicle's occupants (T. 24-27, 34, 35,
69, 74, 75, 78). Mangelson further testified that when Trooper
Ingerman was unable to find defendant's vehicle in the nearby
business area, his suspicions were strengthened because
defendant's vehicle would have to have continued south toward
Levan, which Mangelson considered to be unusual under the
circumstances (T. 35).
Mangelson also testified that he previously had
encountered drug courier scenarios in which two vehicles were
traveling together and that the purpose of the second vehicle is
to protect the first vehicle, sometimes by deliberately breaking
the law if a police officer is seen so that the car carrying the
drugs can continue without being stopped (T. 35, 36, 76). He
further stated that he had experienced cases in which drug
couriers removed the spare tire, luggage and other materials from
the trunk in order to make more room for contraband and that drug
couriers are often heavily armed (T. 37, 75, 76). Finally,
Mangelson testified that after considering all of the factors
enumerated above, in light of his training and experience, he
suspected that defendant's vehicle was involved in transporting
contraband (T. 75, 76). Defendant offered no evidence rebutting
Mangelson's testimony.
The trial court found that "[t]aken as a whole, all
these factors present substantial support for an articulable
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop" of
defendant's vehicle (Ruling at 4).

The court also found that the

"link between the two vehicles, the drugs and firearms in the
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first vehicle stop, and the odor of marijuana in the defendant's
vehicle gave ample cause for search of the defendant's vehicle
for contraband" (id. at 5).

In denying defendant's motion to

suppress, the trial court found that "the actions of Trooper
Mangelson were proper in the stop, arrest, and search of the
[defendant's] car" (Id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress because the investigative stop of his vehicle was based
on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant's
vehicle was involved in illegal drug trafficking, and the
subsequent seizure of marijuana was legally justified.
ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence because Sergeant Mangelson did
not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an
investigative stop of his vehicle (Br. of App. at 5). In
reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court applies the
following standard:
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb it factual evaluation unless
its findings are clearlt erroneous. . . .
The trial judge is in the best position to
assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . .
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
M
correction of error" standard.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert.
granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1990).
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(citations omitted).

But see

State v. Ashef 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987); State v.
Galleqosf 716 P,2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985); State v. Cole, 674
P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983); and State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506,
509-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (which suggest that the "clearly
erroneous" standard applies to both the trial court's factual
evaluation and its legal conclusion).

Because defendant does not

dispute the facts giving rise to the stopping of his vehicle,
this Court need only assess the trial court's legal conclusion
that the investigative stop of defendant's vehicle was
constitutional.
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic
regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d
880, 883 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv.
Rep. 78 (Utah 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

A stop of a vehicle is, of course, also

justified when the officer has probable cause to believe either
the vehicle or an occupant has violated the law.

Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 663.
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).

There the Court held that when "a police officer
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observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his
suspicion. .Id. at 30. A police officer who makes an
investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and
articulable f^cts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."

Id. at 21.

The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah
Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows:
Any peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name,
address, and an explanation of his actions.
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal
activity.'"

State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (citations omitted).

As such, the central issue in the

instant case is whether the trial court properly concluded that
Sergeant Mangelson's investigative stop of defendant's vehicle
was justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on
objective facts.
Defendant asserts that Mangelson stopped his
vehicle based on a "good chance" or "hunch" that it was traveling
with the Arizona vehicle, a vehicle which Mangelson had
already determined was involved in illegal activity.
App. at 4).

(Br. of

Defendant's argument ignores the gradual manner in

which Mangelson's suspicion arose and the specific facts
-11-

which led him to suspect that defendant's vehicle was involved
in the transportation of contraband.

Viewed in its proper

context, the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress clearly demonstrates that Mangelson
had a reasonable suspicion that justified an investigative stop
of defendant's vehicle.
At the suppression hearing Mangelson detailed
numerous factors that led him to stop defendant's vehicle.

When

Mangelson initially observed defendant's vehicle it was speeding
and, had he been able to do so, Mangelson would have stopped
3
defendant's vehicle at that time (T. 19-21).
The vehicle with
Defendant asserts in his brief that Mangelson "testified
that he did not stop the [defendant's] vehicle for the purposes
[sic] of issuing a traffic citation" (Br. of App. at 7). That
assertion distorts the record. Mangelson testified that the
decision as to whether to stop a vehicle for traveling up to five
miles over the speed limit was a matter of officer discretion (T.
84). He also testified that he personally did not "always" issue
a citation, and that sometimes he issues "a warning" (T. 74).
During his cross-examination of Mangelson, defense counsel
posed the following question: "[B]asically, you didn't stop
. . . [defendant's] car for any traffic citation, did you?" (T.
78).
Mangelson answered, "I believe I just testified [to] my
reasons for stopping it. He was speeding. He was doing 70. He
had been doing 70 earlier. . . " (Ici. ). Mangelson went on to
indicate that the fact that defendant was speeding was "part of"
his reason for stopping defendant's vehicle (Id.).
While much of the testimony provided at the hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress concentrated on the question of
whether there existed a reasonable suspicion to justify stopping
defendant's vehicle to investigate for drug trafficking,
Mangelson could have stopped defendant for speeding because he
had clocked defendant's vehicle traveling at 70 miles per hour,
five miles over the posted speed limit (T. 19). See Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (holding that M[t]he fact
that the officer does not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification
for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken so
long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the
action").
Mangelson did attempt to stop defendant's vehicle when he
first observed it speeding (T. 19-21). He also testified that
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which defendant appeared to be traveling was also speeding (T.
19).

Not only were the two vehicles maintaining the same rate of

speed, but they were also traveling very close to each other,
within approximately three car lengths (T. 19-20).

The vehicles

both exited 1-15 at the same point (T. 19). Both vehicles turned
onto Highway 28 and both proceeded in the same direction (Id.).
However, Mangelson did not at that point suspect that the two
vehicles were transporting contraband.

He intended to stop both

vehicles because he had observed each committing traffic offenses
(T. 20). When only the Arizona vehicle stopped, Mangelson was
not able to pursue defendant's vehicle (T. 20-21).
Defendant argues that the seizure of his vehicle
"simply because it [was traveling] in close proximity to another
vehicle, which [was] involved in illegal activity . . . " was
unconstitutional (Br. of App. at 8). Defendant's assertion lacks
merit because it is contrary to United States Supreme Court
precedent and is based on a flawed analysis of the facts faced by
Mangelson.

In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985),

the United States Supreme Court found that where two vehicles
appeared to have been traveling in tandem, law enforcement
officials were justified in stopping both vehicles even though
only one was believed to be carrying drugs.

In the instant case,

defendant's vehicle was not stopped simply because it was

Cont. his observation of defendant's vehicle speeding played a
role in his decision to stop the vehicle (T. 78). Consequently,
should it choose to do so, this Court may dispose of this case on
the grounds that the stop of defendant's vehicle was justified
because Mangelson had previously observed it committing a traffic
violation.
-13-

traveling in close proximity to another vehicle.

Rather,

the most critical facts which led Sergeant Mangelson to suspect
that the two vehicles were traveling together and involved in
criminal activity came to light when he investigated the Arizona
vehicle.
During a search of the Arizona vehicle, Mangelson found
drug paraphernalia, cocaine, marijuana, numerous weapons, and
luggage that did not belong to any of the occupants of the
stopped vehicle (T. 25-27, 30, 35). The individuals in the
Arizona vehicle not only denied any knowledge of the drugs and
drug paraphernalia, but also said that they "had no idea" who
Steven Gregory was even though a suitcase bearing his name was in
the trunk of their car (T. 26, 32). The Arizona vehicle also was
carrying two spare tires—one of which could not possibly have
fit that car (T. 27, 30, 35). Finally, after Trooper Ingerman,
Mangelson's backup officer, was unable to locate defendant's
vehicle in the business area of Nephi, where one might reasonably
have expected it to be, defendant drove past the scene where the
Arizona vehicle had been stopped (T. 35, 37-38).

As the Court

said in Sharpe, "[p]erhaps none of these facts, standing alone,
would give rise to a reasonable suspicion; but taken together as
appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer, they provide
clear justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited
investigation."

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 n. 3.

Mangelson analyzed the facts before him in light of his
training and experience.

See State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 508

(officers are "entitled to assess the facts in light of [their]
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experience") (quoting United States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 885 (1975)).

Mangelson had on prior occasions encountered

drug courier scenarios where two vehicles had been traveling
together (T. 35-36).

He also had encountered cases in which drug

traffickers removed the spare tire, luggage and other material
from the trunk of the vehicle in order to make more room for
contraband (T. 37, 75). Finally, Mangelson testified that drug
traffickers are often heavily armed (T. 76). See State v.
Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result) (officer "reasonably could assume that
those participating in moving large quantities of illegal drugs
over long distances might be armed to protect themselves from
criminals who might attempt to 'rip-off a drug dealer").

All of

these factors were apparent to Mangelson after he searched the
Arizona vehicle.

Based on his evaluation of the facts before

him, Mangelson concluded that defendant's vehicle and the Arizona
vehicle were acting in tandem to transport contraband (T. 7576). 4
Defendant would have this Court cast aside the
cumulative weight of numerous facts as appraised by a highly
trained law enforcement officer with over 22 years of experience

While some of the factors relied upon by Mangelson to
justify his investigative stop of defendant's vehicle may be set
forth in a "drug courier profile," that does not alter this
Court's analysis. See United States v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581,
1587 (1989) ("A Court sitting to determine the existence of
reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the
factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these
factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not somehow detract
from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained
agent•").
-15-

in favor of a much narrower focus upon defendant's close
proximity to another vehicle.

That position reflects a

fundamental misunderstanding of the reasonable suspicion test.
As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Sokolow, "[i]n
evaluating the validity of a stop such as this, we must consider
'the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.'"
Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting United States v. Cortez# 449
U.S. 411, 417 (1981)); see also, State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 509
(indicating that the actions of police officers "are to be
objectively assessed in light of all the facts and circumstances
confronting the officers at the time").

Indeed, Terry itself

involved "a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent" if
viewed separately, "but which taken together warranted further
investigation."

392 U.S. at 22.

In the instant case, the trial

court recognized the Terry standard when it held that "[t]aken as
whole, all of these factors present substantial support for an
articulable reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop"
of defendant's vehicle (Ruling at 4).
Defendant also appears to argue that even if the
initial stop of his vehicle was proper, once he provided
Mangelson with his name and address pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-7-15 (1990), defendant should have been "free to go because
there existed no reason whatsoever to detain him" (Br. of App. at
10).

Defendant failed to raise the issue of defendant's

detention in his motion to suppress, and Utah appellate courts
will not entertain on appeal an issue not properly raised below.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here a
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defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate
court will not consider that ground on appeal.")
Should this Court address the merits of defendant's
argument, it will see that defendant incorrectly applies the
standard for constitutional detention as articulated in United
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), and applied by
this Court in State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 884, and State v.
Robinson, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

As

stated in Marshall, the "question is whether . . . [the state
trooper's] subsequent detention and questioning of . . •
[defendant] was reasonably related to the initial traffic stop or
was justified because . . . [the trooper] had a reasonable
suspicion to believe . . . [defendant] was engaged in a more
serious crime."

^d. at 884.

See also Robinson, 140 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 18.
Defendant here was not detained solely because he had
been observed speeding; defendant was detained because Mangelson
"reasonably suspected" that he was transporting illegal drugs.
The very strong odor of marijuana coming from defendant's
vehicle, the presence of which defendant does not contest, and
the presence of passenger Steven Gregory, which clearly linked
defendant's vehicle to the Arizona vehicle, justified detaining
defendant even after he had provided identification.

Finally,

defendant was arrested only after Mangelson confirmed that the
trunk of his vehicle was full of marijuana, which clearly

-17-

established probable cause for his arrest.
Defendant appears to argue that Mangelson lacked
probable cause to arrest him but articulates no argument to
explain why an allegedly illegal arrest would require exclusion
of evidence seized (Br. of App. at 10-11). The question is
wholly irrelevant to defendant's motion to suppress. The State
did not seek to justify the warrantless search of defendant's
vehicle based on the search incident to an arrest exception
recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and
the trial court did not admit evidence or rule on that basis.
Defendant's vehicle was searched pursuant to the
automobile exception rule which was first developed by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). In Carroll the Court stated that, if reasonable and
probable cause existed for believing that a vehicle contained
contraband, an officer could search the vehicle for that
contraband without a warrant. Id. at 153, 156. The Court has
consistently held that a search warrant is not necessary where
there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway because the car is movable, the occupants are alerted to
the officer's intention to search the vehicle, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals
have recognized and applied the Carroll-Chambers doctrine. See
State v. Shields, 28 Utah 405, 406; 503 P.2d 848, 849 (1972);
State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah (1978); State v. Droneburg, 781
P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In the instant case, the
circumstances of the warrantless search fall squarely within the
automobile exception. The vehicle was lawfully stopped on a
highway, 1-15, and remained mobile. Defendant was alerted to
Mangelson's intent to search for contraband, and defendant could
have disposed of the evidence had he not been detained and his
vehicle searched.
Should this Court decide to reach the issue of whether
there was probable cause to arrest defendant, several points
warrant discussion. Defendant takes issue with what he
characterizes as the trial court's holding "that once the
identity of the [passenger] Steven James Gregory was established
the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant Glorioso" (Br.
of App. at 10). Although defendant does not cite to the record,
the phrase to which he appears to be referring has been taken out
of context. The trial court concluded that Gregory's presence in
defendant's vehicle, along with Gregory's admission that they
were travelling with the Arizona vehicle, enabled Mangelson to
"positively link" the two vehicles (Ruling at 5). The trial
court went on to conclude that "[t]he evidence found in the first
car stopped was more than enough to justify the arrest of Mr.
Gregory and Mr. Glorioso when the link between the two cars was
made" (Id.).
Even if this Court were to reject the trial court's
conclusion, there are other grounds upon which it can rely to
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The evidence presented at the hearing on defendant's
motion to suppress provided overwhelming support for the trial
court's conclusion that there was a reasonable suspicion to
justify an investigative stop of defendant's vehicle.

The trial

court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the seized
evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed,
DATED this

/P

day of September, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON
Assistant Attorney General

Cont. find that there was probable cause to arrest defendant.
See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) (an appellate
court "may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper
grounds, even though the trial court assigned another reason for
its ruling").
In the instant case, the fact that the trunk of
defendant's vehicle "was full of marijuana," a fact that
defendant does not contest, clearly established probable cause
for arrest under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2) (1990) (T. 44).
Furthermore, a recent decision from this Court suggests that
there may have been probable cause for arrest once Mangelson
detected the "very strong odor" of raw marijuana coming from
defendant's vehicle, another fact that defendant does not contest
(T. 43). See State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that probable cause for arrest may arise from
an officer's sense of smell and citing State v. Valenzuela, 121
Ariz. 274, 589 P.2d 1306, 1307 (1979) (odor of marijuana). The
evidence presented at the hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress not only established that there was a reasonable
suspicion to justify an investigative stop of defendant's
vehicle, but also demonstrated that there was probable cause for
the search of defendant's vehicle and for his arrest.
-19-
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ADDENDUM A

KCQ
M b '. : '
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

Case Number

STATE OF UTAH,

88-CR-0042
88-CR-0043

COURT OF APPEALS NO. 900170-CA
D i s t r i c t Crt. No. 185-D

Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.
JEFFERY GLORIOSO and STEPHEN
JAMES GREGORY,
Defendant.
********

This matter came before the Court on defendant's motion
to suppress on the 8th day of August, 1989.
for the State.
counsel.

Donald Eyre appeared

Both defendants were present and represented by

Defendant

Gregory

was

represented

by

Mr.

Robert

Archuleta and defendant Glorioso was represented by Mr. Esparza.
Witnesses were called and evidence was presented.

The Court,

having carefully considered all the evidence enters now its:
RULING
On 15 November, 1988, Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul
Mangelson was engaged in traffic patrol on
near Nephi in Juab County.

Interstate Highway 15

He observed two vehicles traveJing

northbound within three car lengths of each other.

The officer

determined, by radar, that the vehicles were traveling five miles
per hour over the posted speed limit of 65.

Trooper Mangelson

began to pursue the vehicles; both of which took the South Nephi
exit off the freeway.

While the front vehicle did not stop for

Mf 900)70

Mangelson, he noted the color, that it had Florida plates, and
two occupants.

The second vehicle did stop for Mangelson.

it

had Arizona plates and three occupants.
Mangelson advised the occupants of the stopped vehicle
of the reasons for the stop and requested
registration

information

of

the

identification and

occupants.

The

occupants

indicated they were traveling to Montana to visit friends but
were unable to state who those friends were.

As he talked with

the occupants, Mangelson detected a strong odor of Marijuana.

He

asked if there was any drugs or firearms in the vehicle to which
the occupants

responded in

the negative.

Mangelson

requested a

search of the vehicle and the occupants consented.
Search of the vehicle passenger compartment revealed a
loaded pistol, and substantial amounts of cocaine and marijuana.
The trunk contained two tires, at least one of which could not
have belonged to the stopped vehicle and a suitcase with the name
of Stephen Gregory on the handle.

None of the occupants of the

car was named Stephen Gregory.

The suitcase contained some

weapons, including a large knife and a loaded pistol.
The sergeant requested a back-up officer to search the
area for the front vehicle.

The search was unsuccessful.

After

placing the occupants of the second vehicle in custody, Mangelson
saw the front vehicle again, pursued
request

for

identification

revealed

it and stopped
that

it.

A

the occupants were

Jeffery Glorioso and Stephen Gregory here entitled defendants.
Mangelson noted that one of the spare tires in the other vehicle

would

fit defendants' vehicle, Gregory admitted

that they were

traveling with the other vehicle to Montana to visit his father
who was ill.

Mangelson detected the smell of marijuana coming

from the vehicle.

His request for a search of the vehicle was

apparently denied.

Mangelson arrested the defendants and advised

them

of their

compartment
locate

rights.

He subsequently

searched

the passenger

of the vehicle but found nothing and was unable to

a key to the trunk.

Removal of the back seat of the

vehicle led to a stronger odor of marijuana.

The car was removed

to the public safety building where the trunk was searched.

The

trunk contained 153 lbs. of marijuana.
This Court makes no determination

as to whether

initial stop of the trailing vehicle was proper.

the

Both the Utah

Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that
a person has no standing to object to the search of property that
the person does not own or otherwise have an interest in.
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
(Utah 1986).
1987).

Rakas

State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375

See Also, State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App.

In the instant case, the defendants have no possessory or

ownership

interest

defendants

have no

in

the

trailing

legitimate

vehicle.

expectation

vehicle and have no standing to object

Therefore,

of privacy

the

in that

to the stop or search.

The Court therefore confines its analysis to the propriety of the
stop

and

search of

defendants.

the front

vehicle, and

the arrest

of the

The initial stop of the defendants' vehicle was based
on an articulateble and reasonable suspicion.

In fact it would

appear to a reasonable person that the vehicles were traveling
together.

They were in close proximity.

at the same point.

They exited the freeway

The trailing car contained items that did not

belong either to the car or the occupants therein

(but, as was

subsequently

to

Gregory).

drug

couriers

Furthermore,
frequently

shown,

did

contain

Mangelsonfs

items

testimony

remove spare tires and

make space for the drugs.
trailing vehicle.

belonging

was

that

luggage from one vehicle to

Drugs and firearms were found in the

Taken as a whole, all these factors present

substantial support for an articulateble reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop.
Where there is a reasonable suspicion, making a stop to
determine

if a crime has been committed

is not

a seizure, as

alleged by the defendants. Nor does it require Miranda warnings.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that Miranda warnings are
required only when a stop becomes custodial or the environment
becomes accusatory.
1170 (1983).
checking

of

Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P. 2d 1168,

The initial stop in this case involved the simple
identification

and

registration.

This

cannot

be

considered custodial nor accusatory.
When the identity of one of the occupants was confirmed
as being Stephen Gregory, Mangelson had probable cause necessary
for arrest.

While Mangelson had a reasonable suspicion necessary

to stop the car, he did not have the probable cause necessary for

arrest until he could positively link the occupants of the front
vehicle to the following vehicle.

This

link was made when

Mangelson was able to identify Stephen Gregory.

The link was

further solidified by Gregory's admission that the two vehicles
were traveling together.

The evidence found in the first car

stopped was more than enough to justify the arrest of Mr. Gregory
and Mr. Glorioso when the link between the two cars was made.
The
firearms

link

found

between

the two

vehicles, the

drugs and

in the first vehicle stop, and the odor of

marijuana in the defendants1 vehicle gave ample cause for search
of the defendants1 vehicle for contraband.
that

where

such

mobility,

a

vehicle

retains

a

It is well documented
reasonable

degree

search may take place without a warrant.

of

United

States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
As to the subsequent
after

it had

been removed

building, both the

search of defendants' vehicle

to the custody of public safety

Supreme Courts of Utah and the United States

have upheld such a search without a warrant.

In State v. Earl,

716 P. 2d 803, 805 (1986) the Utah Supreme Court, citing the
United States Supreme Court, held that if there is probable cause
to search a vehicle at the scene, there is no search warrant
requirement to search the vehicle after it has been impounded.
That is what happened in this case.
In

light

of

the

above-mentioned

facts,

the

Court

concludes that the actions of Trooper Mangelson were proper in
the

stop,

arrest,

and

search

of

the

car

operated

by

the

defendants,

The

motion

of

the

defendants

to

suppress

evidence in this case is therefore denied.
Dated this

p

day of September, 1989.
BY THE COURT

GEORGE £. BALL IF, JUDjSE

cc:

Robert Archuleta
James Esparza
Donald Eyre

the

